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In the Hope for Change:
Media and Audience in the Post-Charisma 
Era in Benin and Togo
TANAKA Masataka
Introduction: Media and People in the Changing Era of West Africa
Benin is a West African nation in which political leadership has changed 
three times since the democratic transition.  Togo, another West African 
nation, has also experienced political turmoil since the death of its president 
and his son’s subsequent takeover in ₂₀₀₅.  These neighboring states have 
many things in common such as democratization passed by a National 
Conference, (Ｃｏｎｆéｒｅｎｃｅ　ɴａｔｉｏｎａˡｅ) generational changes in charismatic politi-
cal leaders, and an animated private media-backed dialogue among the people. 
In addressing the recent political situations in these states, we consider people’s 
hopes in an era of post-charismatic political actors (Alber, van der Geest & 
Whyte ₂₀₀₈).  The charisma of these countries’ former presidents has had a 
significant influence.  We focus on events other than action and mobilization 
such as demonstrations, voting, marches, party action.  This refers to earlier 
studies of African political anthropology taking up various grassroots actions 
as political expression.
Comi Toulabor, a Togolese political scientist, contrasted people’s repre-
sentation of power with legitimated political power and then examined political 
power after democratization, not only in the realm of traditional politics but 
also in its cultural aspects (Toulabor ₁₉₉₂).  Considering people’s derision, 
mockery, and rumors of power, he examined the local political situation as 
well as the use of religious or mythical s
（1）
ymbols.
Achille Mbembe, a Cameroonian political scientist and thinker, indicated 
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that African rulers and people were connected via the conviviality of various 
events or festivals, citing newspaper cartoons as an example (Mbembe ₂₀₀₁). 
While the government called on people to participate in the events, mobilizing 
symbolically, people responded by evading t
（2）
hem.  In a postcolonial political 
structure there has been a shift from political and economic subjugation in 
one direction to a subtle power relation, which works in multi- and two-way 
directions as well as subconsciously, according to Mbembe.
In his ethnography of Africa’s media, Francis Nyamnjoh, a Cameroonian 
political anthropologist, confirmed that media play a role in empowering people 
and supporting democracy, yet he indicates the insufficient deontology and 
negative function of media in Africa (Nyamnjoh ₂₀₀₅).
These studies, called ʟｅ　ｐｏˡｉｔｉｑｕｅ　ｐａｒ　ˡｅ　ｂａｓ, have brought to light things 
that had not been focused on previously, such as rumors, cartoons, and convivial 
events, and determined the political significance in their influence, therefore 
creating a shift in the history of African studies.  Based on these studies, this 
paper explores opinions expressed in radio programs and interviews regarding 
politics that indicate a hope people have for the future, which have not always 
been a
（3）
pparent.  The following sections will address recent political situations 
in Togo and B
（4）
enin.
After Eyadéma in Togo
After ₃₈ years in power, Togo dictator, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, died in 
February of ₂₀₀₅.  Acting as the father of his nation with funds from phos-
phorus resources and French financing, he ruled the nation with so-called 
Ｅｙａｄéⅿａïｓⅿ and deified himself by establishing memorial days, places, and 
events associated with his own political biography (Piot ₂₀₁₀：₂₆‒₂₈). 
Immediately following his death the Constitution was revised and his son suc-
ceeded him in power, triggering severe criticism at home and overseas. 
Ensuing demonstrations and conflicts with the army caused approximately 
₂₃︐₀₀₀ to flee to neighboring countries.  The disturbance was so played up in 
the media that people still have vivid memories of the events of ₂₀₀₅.
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The new president, Faure Gnassingbé, and his government made efforts 
to appease internal opposition, but they were firmly rejected.  Most Togolese 
were tired of ₄₀ years of domination by the dynastic Gnassingbé family.  For 
instance, the result of the national election in ₂₀₀₇ showed that the Union of 
the Forces for Change (UFC), the first opposition party, amassed considerable 
votes as the majority of those in the southern region, the center of politics 
and economy, supported it.
However, the Faure government carried out domestic reforms little by 
little, repairing roads in urban regions such as Lomé and Kara, improving 
medical facilities, and so forth.  The EU’s economic sanctions have lifted since 
Togo’s government pledged to democratize at Brussels in ₂₀₀₄.  In the presi-
dential election of ₂₀₁₀, Faure was elected, receiving over ₆₀% of the votes, 
with the result that the opposition could not unite and nominate one candidate. 
This situation created a turning point in the political history of Togo.
Groping for a New Order
In May of ₂₀₁₀, Gilchrist Olympio, the leader of the first opposition 
party, determined to form a coalition with the Rally of Togolese People (RPT), 
the ruling party, which resulted in the UFC’s obtaining seven cabinet posts 
(Tété ₂₀₁₂：₁₅₀‒₁₅₅).  This was a symbolic moment of reconciliation between 
the family of Gnassingbé and that of Olympio, which had been in opposition 
for ₄₇ years.  People were disheartened by this reconciliation and viewed it 
as the collapse of a charismatic leader.  However, it became obvious that a 
new generation had replaced the political actors of the Independence Era or 
Democratic Turn.
Togo suffered a serious economic crisis when European investment 
declined and the world economy went into a recession in the ₂₀₀₀s.  The UFC 
seemed to have no choice except coalition because domestic conflict would 
turn out to be futile and it could longer remain the opposition party.  After 
₄₀ years, however, the UFC had not inherited and thus could not transmit 
the know-how required to manage the state, as indicated by Olympio after-
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wards (ʟｉｂｅｒｔé, No. ₇₂₆, ₂₀ May ₂₀₁₀).
In ₂₀₁₂, Faure dissolved the RPT of the old regime and transformed 
it into the party of the Union for the Republic (UNIR) in order to improve 
the image of political realignment.  Displaying the achievements of building 
Lomé’s infrastructure and international airport, supporting thriving busi-
nesses, and attracting foreign investment, the government advocated change 
in continuity and in stability, implying that the Faure government was sure 
to develop social and economic conditions with its inherited leadership.  In 
contrast, the oppositions could not present a promising vision of the nation to 
their supporters.  Soon thereafter some representatives switched from the 
opposition to the UNIR.  The Togolese public then grew tired of the opposi-
tion’s boycotting.  This was the confused situation in Togo following the gen-
erational change of political actors.  The next section will address the 
generational and political changing circumstances in Benin.
Change of Generation in the Political Scene of Benin
In the presidential election of March ₂₀₀₆, Mathieu Kérékou and 
Nicéphore Soglo, charismatic figures who led the democratization, declared 
that they would withdraw their candidacies in accordance with the 
Constitution.  Adrien Houngbédji, the leader of the Democratic Renewal Party, 
and Bruno Amoussou, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, ran for the 
presidency because they were well-known political actors and masters of 
conducting state affairs.  However, people turned to an outsider with no prior 
political experience who was president of the Central Bank of West African 
States (BCEAO).  Unlike his rivals the candidate, Yayi Boni, did not belong 
to a political party or specific ethnic group.  Using the slogan Çａ　ｖａ　ｃʰａｎɡｅ 
(“It will change”), he received three-quarters of the votes and overwhelmingly 
defeated Houngbédji in the run-off election.
Was ˡｅ　Ｃʰａｎɡｅⅿｅｎｔ (“the Change”) effective?  The policies of the Yayi 
government directly affected people’s lives in the following ways:
（₁） Maintenance of infrastructure: paved roads, electricity, and water 
65真宗総合研究所研究紀要　第₃₆号
supply
（₂）Improved working conditions for teachers and public officials
（₃）Free elementary education
（₄）Micro financial support for working women
It is true that these concrete policies took effect and that people who 
enjoyed these benefits, particularly the third and fourth ones, supported the 
government.  These provisions enabled women and children to participate in 
work and school, opportunities that they had not previously enjoyed.  However, 
many others believed that if women were furnished with microcredits, they 
would not use such funds for business but spend them on their families and 
daily needs.  The structural problem of poverty could not be solved so easily, 
according to the opposition.  At about the same time a serious scandal was 
brought to light in relation to the government.
In ₂₀₀₆ the ICC Service, a would-be non-governmental organization, 
began to operate a mutual financing association in various areas of B
（5）
enin.  It 
advertised that people who deposited money with ICC would be offered an 
exceptional interest rate of ₂₀₀% for one year.  Tempted by this advertising, 
many people joined.  However, the service suddenly suspended payments and 
defaulted on contracts in ₂₀₁₀.  A protest movement was started against this 
scheme, and it quickly expanded from urban to other areas.  Even worse, 
before this failure the ICC’s chief executive had maintained a close relationship 
with cabinet ministers, a fact that was disclosed by the media.  The police 
suspended ICC’s services in July of ₂₀₁₀.
Against a backdrop of criticism of the administration and a mistrust of 
politics, a presidential election was called for in ₂₀₁₁.  The election centered 
on three candidates, Yayi and two opponents.  The first rival candidate, 
Houngbéji, took all possible measures to form a political alliance, thinking that 
this would be his last chance to win and coalesce the opposition to form a 
party union, the Union fait la Nation (UN).  The second rival candidate was 
Abdoulayi Bio Tchané, known as ABT, who had been Director General of 
BCEAO in Senegal and who was born in the northern prefecture of Donga. 
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He aimed to deprive Yayi of his power base, the northern regions.
In the March ₂₀₁₁ contest the Election Administration Committee 
(CENA) counted votes immediately, and an initial count from southern regions 
appeared to be in favor of Houngbédji.  However, when the overall election 
results were in, CENA declared that Yayi was re-elected since he won a 
majority of votes.  Yayi received ₅₃% of the votes, Houngbédji ₃₅%, ABT ₆%, 
and other candidates shared the remaining ₆%.
Hope for post-Le Changement
What about the Change?  At about this same time, in addition to the 
ICC affair, other scandals occurred such as padded accounts in preparation 
for the Cén-Sad summit, inflated expenses for the Maria Gleta power plant, 
and embezzlement of Dutch financing for the water supply.  These scandals 
heightened the populace’s suspicion of political, governmental, and industrial 
c
（6）
orruption.  Furthermore, Yayi appointed Lionel Zinsou, who had connections 
to the French prime minister as his successor, thinking that doing so would 
help his personal influence.  This action provoked even more defectors. 
Disheartened over Yayi’s attitudes, people began to look toward other candi-
dates, such as Pascal I. Koupaki, Minister of Plans, ex-candidate ABT, and 
Sébastien Ajavon, a young successful businessman.
Around the year before the election, an independent candidate, Patrice 
Talon, emerged to the front.  He had backed the inauguration of the Yayi 
government since ₂₀₀₆.  Talon had graduated from Cheikh Anta Diop Univer-
sity in Senegal and attended an airline company’s training course in France 
before returning to become a successful businessman, well known as the 
Cotton Billionaire or King of Cotton in Benin.  As many as ₃₃ candidates ran 
for the presidential election of ₂₀₁₆.  Talon finally won a run-off to become 
the seventh President by breaking away from the Yayi regime.
A review of national elections in Benin after the Democratic Turn of 
₁₉₉₀ indicates that political corruption and imbroglio in the Assembly continued 
despite changes of government.  Newcomers, especially if political outsiders, 
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were favored by Beninese voters to become president.  Usually, however, they 
were compelled to resign sooner or later due to corruption scandals and alle-
gations of seeking a third term.  As the corruption continued, another new-
comer was expected to win.  Regarding the history of favoring outsiders, we 
can find no difference or evidence of progress between Yayi and Talon, but 
rather a kind of reiteration, even when compared to Soglo.  To understand 
this pattern, we will discuss discourse on the political scene in the following 
sections.
Media Scene in Benin and Togo
Utilization of cellular phones and smartphones as well as the Internet 
is widespread in present-day African society.  Whereas the situation involving 
water, electricity, and infrastructure has not markedly improved, Africans 
send text messages and phone calls with rechargeable cell phone, getting 
information from radio rather than from TV.  Brief histories of media in the 
two nations are instructive.
In Benin radio broadcasting began in ₁₉₅₃ under the French colonial 
regime.  Before and after the Democratic Turn in ₁₉₉₀, private newspapers 
reported political issues, and both radio and TV stations met the needs of 
audiences, broadcasting in local and multiple languages.  The Office of Radio 
and Television in Benin (ORTB) was at the core of all media there, and many 
stations came into being after the liberalization of frequency in ₁₉₉₇.  The 
Beninese people could tune into more than ₃ TV and ₇₀ private radio stations 
after ₂₀₀₈ (Allagbada ₂₀₁₄；ODEM ₂₀₀₁；Frère ₂₀₀₀).
In Togo, although a radio station had existed since the ₁₉₅₀s, the media 
was only used for propaganda by the government between ₁₉₆₇ (Eyadéma’s 
coup-d’état) and ₁₉₉₀ (National Conference).  Togo Television, the core of 
Togolese media, was occupied at the time of military intervention in ₁₉₉₁, 
whereas various private newspapers had been issued since ₁₉₈₉, reporting 
news from a viewpoint other than the government’s.  After the pledge at 
Brussels in ₂₀₀₄, freedom of the press had been guaranteed, so that public 
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and private broadcasting stations soon totaled more than ₇₀ (Vondoly ₂₀₁₅；
Rambaud ₂₀₀₆).
Participation programs on private radio quickly gained popularity in 
both Benin and Togo.  When the state-operated station controlled the flow of 
information, it broadcast one-way programs on domestic news and state public-
ity.  However, private stations appealed to audiences because they disseminated 
local information.  Although there were few cell phone users in the ₁₉₉₀s, this 
number has rapidly increased since the ₂₀₀₀s, and people began to call into 
programs with this new tool.  The form of participation varied, from requests 
for music selections to opinions on political matters, and audiences were able 
to access the media e
（7）
asily.
In this kind of media environment after the Democratic Turn, Africans 
express their opinions and exchange information vigorously.  Participation 
programs in particular allow for free-flowing exchanges among audience 
members.  Thus, we can grasp some idea of public opinion from the voices of 
active audiences on these p
（8）
rograms.  Interestingly, each program has some 
regular audiences who express their opinions frequently, so that we will explore 
these exchanges as examples of public opinion in the next section.
Nuhountolé and Their Opinions
Some audience members not only listened to radio programs but also 
became regulars who called into the stations.  They became acquainted with 
the announcer and other aspects of the station, calling themselves ɴｕʰｏｕｎｔｏˡé, 
“those who express their opinions.” They had connections with each other and 
formed “fun” clubs to support particular programs and stations.
In the case of Radio Tokpa situated in one corner of the Dantokpa 
market in Cotonou, a capital of Benin, an old man called the station frequently. 
Known as “Mr. H” and born in ₁₉₄₂, he organized a club in support of Radio 
Tokpa and became its president.  He was interviewed because of having trip-
lets in the past, and the journalist at that time established a new radio station, 
Radio Tokpa.  This is why he began to organize the club and to back the 
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station.  Even after he retired from his work as bureau chief of a factory in 
₂₀₀₂, he remained the organizer of this club (summary of interview, August 
₂₀₁₂, Cotonou).  Thus, he and others supported a media program in which 
audience members could actively communicate their opinions.
In the following, we will compare the political views of ɴｕʰｏｕｎｔｏˡé in 
Togo and Benin.  Even after a change of government, the influence of the 
Eyadéma regime persisted in Togo.  The control of expression and unwar-
ranted detention under the previous regime were still vivid in people’s memo-
ries.  Despite searching for active audiences in Togo, it was difficult to find 
anonymous audiences through connections of multiple journalists.  Excerpts 
from these interviews follow (interview, ₂₄‒₂₅ August ₂₀₁₆, Lomé).
I am one of the generations that knew well Dictator Eyadéma and his 
regime.  I can well recall the assassination of Sylvanus Olympio, the 
hero of the Independence Era, on January ₁₃, ₁₉₆₃.  We could not even 
talk about this kind of matter.  But now we can express our opinion. 
This is a big step.  Still, this is not change in the true sense.  It is the 
public who are the patrons of democracy.  The patron is not the chief; 
it ought to be the public, so that in the election we can choose the 
person to be elected.  So freedom of expression and its circulation and 
also egalitarianism are important.  Particularly freedom of expression 
is so necessary; we must encourage this.  Some who are frightened 
agree with our intervention.  We know each other well.  We do not fear 
anything.  That’s why we take intervention in the program by calling 
in.  We should not leave our nation as it is.  What we are doing now 
will be good for the next generation. (age ₆₅, male, ex-communication 
engineer)
This speaker remembered well the control of expression under the 
previous regime.  Many of his acquaintances were wounded and became 
refugees in the democratization disturbances of the ₁₉₉₀s.  The actual situa-
tion indebted to the pain and hardship of the past.  He therefore understood 
the paramount importance of free speech and of giving fellow Togolese hope 
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for connecting with future generations.
Another regular audience member, an instructor in an IT technical 
school, talked about the politics of Togo.
Togo is a state in the system of a multi-political party democracy, 
whereas the rule of the game is not prevalent yet.  There seems to be 
rupture in a stratum engaged in politics.  Opposition is merely ｓʰａｄ︲
ｏʷｂｏｘｉｎɡ.  As they are always excluded from political affairs of the 
state, their idea of reform takes no effect.  While one says something, 
the other says another thing, and they don’t have dialogue or come to 
terms.  Worse still, younger generations become indifferent to politics; 
that is another concern.  As the older people have managed all, the 
young think they are outcasts from politics, for the older always reign 
over the young.  Although the older generations are replaced by the 
younger, the latter are not entering the political scene.  In fact, the 
younger people are not allowed to participate in the political scene. 
Here in Togo the political debates are not opened up to all strata in 
the true sense of the word, despite generation change. (age ₅₀s, male, 
instructor)
Political leaders in Benin during the Democratic Turn, such as Kérékou 
and Soglo, retired from the political stage, and a generational change has been 
recognized.  However, in Togo the Eyadéma faction is still the majority in the 
Assembly, and therefore the same political force has been in power for more 
than ₄₀ years.  Because the opposition cannot exert influence, their criticisms 
and reforms have not taken effect.  Moreover, in Togo, to open discussions 
with the younger generation and to view this as a public concern are really 
important.  Nevertheless, the young have become indifferent toward politics 
and are not hopeful about the future (cf. Macé ₂₀₀₄：₈₈₁f；Sylvanus ₂₀₁₂).
By way of contrast, the activity of a club shows that exchange of opinion 
in radio program is animated, for the freedom of expression is guaranteed in 
Benin.  People have heated political debates via participatory programs.  As 
to the potential for a change of government in ₂₀₁₇, they were open to 
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discussion as seen in the following three excerpts from interviews.  The 
ɴｕʰｏｕｎｔｏˡé spoke candidly and enthusiastically (interview, ₁₃‒₁₈ August 
₂₀₁₇, Lokossa).
Being tired of the candidate who has political relations, Beninese people 
prefer the candidate who will bring a change to the known politicians. 
They are not constant.  Beninese people are so capricious that they 
give up and begin to criticize the politician as soon as they find him 
incompetent. (age ₅₀s, male, tutor)
Yayi came from the banking and financial circle, while Talon is a busi-
nessman.  Though both Yayi and Talon had worked in foreign countries 
for a long time, their careers have not been the same.  Talon runs 
diverse businesses, such as cotton, fertilizer, hotels, and real estate. 
Zinsou, Talon, Ajavon, and others were running for the election.  It was 
Talon and ʏｏｖｏ (a white＝Zinsou) that advanced to the run-off round. 
As Ajavon stated, he didn’t agree with Yovo and appealed to his sup-
porters to vote for the man that can be agreed upon.  Thus Talon was 
elected finally. (age ₃₀s, male, staff of the ward office)
We voted for Talon because we hoped for him to change the situation. 
After the decade of precedents, we shall see how the new president 
leads us.  Talon explained various things clearly, and his words were 
comprehensible to us, the people.  When Yayi took power, things went 
well.  No troubles for five years.  But he continued for ten years.  Finally 
he exited the same way Soglo did.  So this time, voting for Talon, we 
will see how he guides us.  If Talon cannot manage well, we may put 
Yayi back. (female, grocer, ｖ
（9）
ｏｄｕｎｓｉ)
Due to corruption and a continued recession, the willingness to embrace 
political newcomers has repeated itself in Benin.  The first interviewee indi-
cated that this was because of the Beninese character.  No sooner had people 
voted for one candidate than they began to find fault with him.  Nevertheless, 
changes in political actors and instability should not be harmful, according to 
respondents.  The third interviewee said that those who voted for Talon 
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believed that he would change the nation.  With the new president being just 
one of her choices, she may change to another candidate if he is not qualified. 
She believed, in other words, that people can improve government through 
democratic election.  This is based on the fact that the presidential changes, 
i.e., Soglo, Kérékou, and Yayi, have been peacefully realized in Benin.  Thus, 
a repetition of change is not stagnation or a negative consequence.
On the other hand, the situation seems bleaker and more tenuous in 
Togo.  Despite a generational shift in power, the Togolese can hardly hope for 
an effective change in government.  Therefore they have no choice but to get 
along with the government, for it controls daily concerns such as issuing visas 
and passports.  Although it is true that they seem to suffer from a sense of 
stagnation, ɴｕʰｏｕｎｔｏˡé emphasize the importance of expressing opinions and 
sustaining dialogue.
Conclusion: The Hope for Change and Stability
As Charles Piot, an American social anthropologist, has described them, 
the Togolese long for a future that replaces untoward pasts both politically 
and culturally.  He referred to their mentality as “ɴｏｓｔａˡɡｉａ　ｆｏｒ　ｔʰｅ　Ｆｕｔｕｒｅ” 
(Piot ₂₀₁₀).  Such desire for a different future and a new politics is elusive. 
People place their hope on an uncertain future rather than focusing on past 
disappointments.  In classical political science this approval of a present situ-
ation has been slighted (cf. Bayart, Mbembe & Toulabor ₂₀₀₈：₁₄‒₁₉).  In 
sociology and anthropology, another interpretation may be applicable.  Pierre 
Bourdieu, a sociologist, indicated that French youth tended to delay finding a 
job because they viewed the present and immediate future with uncertainty 
in their rapidly changing society (Bourdieu ₁₉₈₄).  Bourdieu applied the term 
ａˡˡｏｄｏｘｉａ to this misrecognition in which one thing is not recognized for what 
it is because it was not previously within the range of ｄｉｓｐｏｓｉｔｉｏｎｓ and the 
ʰａｂｉｔｕｓ of the person.  Anthropologist brought this to the fore, not only the 
virtual and effective activity but also their thought and talks of life strategy 
with which people live through by conversion of recognition.
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As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, African political anthro-
pologists interested in ʟｅ　ｐｏˡｉｔｉｑｕｅ　ｐａｒ　ˡｅ　ｂａｓ — namely Toulabor, Mbembe, 
and Nyamnjoh — have examined various media images and communication 
that had not previously been considered as political expression.  These included 
pavement radio, rumors, jokes, cartoons, and graffiti that had not immediately 
caused political actions or mobilizations, yet their focus was serious.  This 
paper dealt with the political opinions of regular participants on interactive 
radio programs.
At first the opinions of ɴｕʰｏｕｎｔｏˡé seemed to be distractions from daily 
discontent, but in fact this dialogue or public space was created by the media. 
Radio “fun” clubs in Benin enabled audiences to get to know each other well 
and guaranteed the safety of speakers.  In Togo also such media forums pre-
vented audiences from being in isolation.  Whereas Togolese audiences were 
fearless, freedom of expression in Togo is not as yet fully guaranteed.
With regard to free elementary education and microcredit in Benin, 
and visas and improvement of infrastructure in Togo, the government inter-
venes into the public’s daily life.  People are obliged to accept their govern-
ment’s policies.  Utilizing mass media and cell phones, they therefore exchange 
information with the diaspora overseas as well as with the inhabitants of 
remote areas at home.  Given this situation, while the Beninese view change 
of political leadership as either reformative or progressive, the Togolese com-
promise stability with change in their lives while remaining obedient to the 
government.  For instance, some representatives switched from opposition to 
the UNIR after the transformation of the party in ₂₀₁₂.  In addition, Togolese 
journalists who had severely criticized the government became members of 
the UNIR, looking for connections with ministers or officers.  The Benin 
government advocates continuity of change, whereas the Togolese government 
advocates change in continuity.  This paper has attempted to illuminate actual 
practices in both West African nations by focusing on the discursive maneu-
vering of people, media, and political actors regarding change and continuity.
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Notes
This paper is based on field research in Benin and Togo after ₂₀₀₀ on the correlation 
of media, religion, and democracy in West Africa.  This was supported by JSPS 
KAKENHI Grant Number ₁₅K₀₃₀₅₅, ₂₂₅₂₀₈₂₉.  In the text above I cite interview 
materials, noting dates, place names, and the characteristics of interviewees that I 
recorded.  These materials are translated from French and local languages into 
English.
（₁） Toulabor (₁₉₉₂) gives the following examples.  Using the French language, people 
often distorted ɢｎａｓｓｉｎɡｂé, the family name of the dictator, into ɢｒａｎｄ　Ｓｉｎɡｅ (Big 
Monkey).  The ruling political party, ʀＰＴ, was pronounced as ａｉｒ　ｐéｔé (smell of 
gas).
（₂） Mbembe (₂₀₀₁) also cites as examples symposiums and commemorative events 
that seemed unrelated to political activities.
（₃） For further information on African media, see Bourgault (₁₉₉₅), Hyden, Leslie & 
Ogundimu (₂₀₀₂), Fardon & Furniss (₂₀₀₀), and Tudesq (₂₀₀₂).
（₄） Tanaka (₂₀₁₂) described and critically examined Beninese presidential elections 
in detail.  A Beninese journalist, Kékou (₂₀₁₀), also addressed this issue.  Tété 
(₂₀₁₂), a Togolese journalist, reported Togolese elections in detail.  At times their 
styles tended to become quite emotional.
（₅） ICC Service is an acronym for the Investment Consultancy and Computing Service. 
It defrauded investors of millions of dollars in Benin.  As mentioned in the text, 
ICC operated from ₂₀₀₆ until ₂₀₁₀.
（₆） For further studies of corruption and fraud in African society, see Apter (₁₉₉₉), 
Comaroff & Comaroff (₁₉₉₉), and Adjovi (₂₀₀₃).  Apter based Ｐｏˡｉｔｉｃｓ　ｏｆ　ɪˡˡｕｓｉｏｎ 
on a case study of Nigerian Criminal Code ₄₁₉ and the money politics of then 
President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, so-called IBB in the ₁₉₉₀s.
（₇） For more information on interactive radio programs in Africa, see Mwesige (₂₀₀₉), 
Adjovi (₂₀₀₃), and Gratz (₂₀₁₁).  For comparisons with other regions of the world, 
see Ninan (₂₀₀₉) and Bessire & Fisher (₂₀₁₃).
（₈） Regarding anthropological issues of media and journalism, other helpful sources 
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include Hannerz (₂₀₀₂), Ninan (₂₀₀₉), and Gratz (₂₀₁₁).
（₉） Ｖｏｄｕｎ is the traditional religion in Benin and Togo.  For more details see 
Amouzouvi (₂₀₁₄).
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